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Abstract
Producers or consumers faced with an increase in taxes are usually able to shift
parts of it to other levels in the value chain. We examine who is actually bearing the
burden of increased energy taxes in the EU-area - consumers or exporters.
Traditional tax incidence theory presumes spot markets. Natural gas in the EU-area,
however, is to a large extent regulated by incomplete long-term contracts. Still, spot
market forces could be indicative for tax shifting, by determining the ex post
bargaining power in contract renegotiations. By examining tax shifting in actual gas
sales contracts we test whether this is the case. To calculate tax incidence we
derive demand elasticities, income elasticities and cross price elasticities for natural
gas, oil and electricity, for different market segments (households, industry, power
generators) in EU countries. Particular focus is on tax incidence in gas markets
regulated by incomplete long-term contracts. Based on our findings we discuss
normative energy tax issues related to revenue, environmental obligations and
security of supply.
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Energy taxes are imposed for fiscal and environmental reasons, both of which are in much
focus in the EU-area due to Kyoto-requirements for reducing emissions and the EMU fiscal
requirements of limiting deficits.
1 Deregulation of energy markets in the EU-area induces
market shifts that call for a recalculation of energy taxes. One type of such shifts is reduced
profit margins in transmission and distribution. Energy taxes are also discussed in relation to
energy security in the 2000 EU Green Paper. A proposal is put forward for a tax on oil, gas
and nuclear energy to finance a fund for start-up investments for renewable energies
The EU-countries are net importers of energy. According to the 2000 green Paper the
EU area is importing 60 per cent of its gas consumption and 90 per cent of its oil
consumption, and the import shares are increasing. New economic trade theory (strategic
trade theory) derives optimal commodity taxes for an importing country, from a fiscal
perspective.
2 An insight from this theory is that a net importing country to some extent may
improve its terms of trade (reduce the exporters' profit margins) by imposing commodity
taxes (energy taxes), and thereby capture parts of the resource rent.
3 There are also factors that
limit such taxes. With an increasing mobility of the corporate tax base, national energy taxes
must be competitive - compared to other countries or regions - to prevent firms from moving
elsewhere.
4 This is a matter of tax revenue and employment. As for households, energy taxes
are prone to be degressive, i.e., to have adverse distributional effects, since a low-income
household typically spends a large share of its budget on heating and transportation, in
relative terms.
The "double dividend" literature 
5 examines the hypothesis that a government can
obtain two gains by increasing energy taxes: (a) environmental gain, and (b) increased
revenues, that may be used to reduce other distortive taxes and thereby yield an efficiency
gain. An objection that has been put forward to this theory is that the result must hinge on
                                                
1 If correctly designed, an energy tax may correct for marginal environmental damage (Pigouvian tax). However,
the same aim may be achieved by using emission regulations or quotas. Tradable quotas are particularly suited as
a cost-effective way to reduce global warming. If emission quotas are sold or auctioned, these may also generate
similar revenue as energy taxes.
2 See, e.g., Debashis and White (1998).
3 To calculate optimal commodity taxes the importing country needs knowledge of supply elasticities, demand
elasticities and cross price elasticities for alternative sources of energy (substitutes).
4 See, e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Osmundsen, Hagen and Schjelderup (1998), and Olsen and
Osmundsen (2000).
5 See, e.g., Pezzy and Park (1998).2
cases where the tax design was not optimal in the first place, and that a re-design of taxes
therefore is not particular to energy taxes.
Our focus is on tax incidence, i.e., on whom is actually bearing the burden of energy
taxes.
6 To address this issue we combine contract theory, public economics and empirical
demand analyses. We survey standard tax incidence theory, which is based on spot trading.
This is illustrative for the oil market. Thereafter, we address an issue relevant for gas supplies,
i.e., tax shifting in the context of long-term supply contracts. Tax incidence is now determined
by renegotiations of incomplete supply contracts, an issue not covered by existing incidence
theory.
7
According to partial tax incidence analyses it is vital to estimate supply and demand
elasticities. We estimate demand elasticities for natural gas in several European countries and
North America. In the econometric model estimations, we apply a “shrinkage” estimator that
allows for cross-country heterogeneity in demand elasticities. Tax incidence is likely to vary
between the short and the long run since customers have larger substitution opportunities in
the long run. We capture this effect by estimating demand elasticities both in the short and the
long run. In addition to the partial incidence effects, general equilibrium effects in energy
markets must be considered. The relevant second-order effects are in our case first of all
determined by cross-price elasticities, which we estimate.
Traditional tax incidence models – market incidence models - presume spot trading.
This is descriptive of the oil market. In this setting, most of the taxes are borne by inflexible
market participants that are unable to escape the tax. Thus, for a given supply elasticity, a
larger share of the tax will be borne by the consumers the lower is their demand elasticity.
Demand elasticities vary among market segments. Our econometric analysis shows that
demand elasticities vary across countries. To support traditional tax incidence analyses, we
calculate demand elasticities for different EU-countries.
Presently, the dominant share of natural gas in the EU-area is not traded on spot terms,
but rather on long-term supply contracts. The UK, however, has had an active spot market for
gas for some years. Recently, a spot market has developed in Seebrugge, after the completion
of the Interconnector gas pipeline between the UK and the Continent. But the prices tend to
follow the prices set in the long-term contracts. Since there still is available capacity (call
                                                
6 Policy implications of this issue is previously surveyed, e.g., by Austvik (1997, 2000). We extend his
presentation by addressing theoretical aspects of energy tax incidence, and by undertaking empirical analyses to
shed light on actual incidence in the OECD-area.
7 See, e.g., Hamilton (1999), Itaya (1995), and Kotlikoff and Summer (1987).3
options) in the long-term contracts, they represent the marginal source of supply and thereby
dictate prices.
The traditional (spot market) tax incidence models are not directly valid in a setting of
long-term contracts. Tax shifting is now in stead determined by the contractual terms and the
system for renegotiations. We let contract incidence denote tax shifting regulated by contracts
as opposed to determined by spot markets. Still, spot market forces may affect underlying
bargaining power in contract renegotiations, and thus be indicative for contract tax incidence.
To ascertain tax incidence for natural gas import prices, we specify and estimate an
econometric model, and compare our empirical findings with traditional tax incidence models
assuming spot markets.
2. Tax incidence
Basic insights from tax incidence theory may be derived in a simple partial and static model.
In the absence of taxation, equilibrium energy price is attained where demand equals supply:
(2.1) ) ( ) ( P S P D = .
An energy tax, τ , introduces a wedge between prices to be paid by the consumers,  c P , and
prices received by the producers,  p P :
(2.2) τ + = p c P P ,
with the after-tax equilibrium given by

























where  D e  is the demand elasticity and  S e  is the supply elasticity. This is a simple partial
equilibrium approach that does not capture all relevant aspects of tax incidence. Still, it
provides an intuitive approach to tax incidence and according to Kotlikoff and Summers
(1987) two important principles that emerge from the analysis remain valid also in a more
fully specified model.
First, tax incidence does not depend on which part of a market the tax is assessed, i.e.,
the person who effectively pays a tax is not necessarily the person upon whom the tax is
levied. In particular, it is of no material relevance for actual tax bearing whether an energy tax
is levied on extraction companies, transmission or distribution companies, or consumers.
However, the fiscal implications may differ, we should add, if the different parties are located
in different countries. According to the international source principle of taxation, companies
are taxed at source, i.e., where the economic activity is located. Thus, government revenues of
petroleum exporting versus importing countries are affected by which level in the value chain
the taxes are levied. It is reasonable to consider this as a revenue game between exporting and
importing nations.
The second principle emerging from the basic tax incidence model is that taxes will be
shifted by those agents and factors that are more elastic in supply and demand, those who can
escape the tax. Energy taxes can be shifted forward (downstream) to transmission companies,
distribution companies or consumers, or backwards (upstream) to producers. Generally, the
taxes will be borne by those who cannot easily adjust. Thus, taxes are borne by inelastic
buyers or sellers, as is evident from Eq. (2.5). It can also be shown in a diagram. In Figure 1
taxes are illustrated as a negative shift in the demand curve, equal to the tax wedge.5
Figure 1: Tax incidence.
In before-tax equilibrium, point c, the producer price equals the consumer price. We
see that the introduction of a tax reduces the quantity traded, leading to a traditional
deadweight loss (tax inefficiency) given by the triangle bce.
8 Also, both the producer and the
consumer price are reduced, i.e., the tax burden is shared among the parties, with the area
abcd representing the reduction in consumer surplus and cdfe the reduction in producer
surplus.
 9
Tax incidence is most easily illustrated by examining some extreme cases. If supply is
perfectly elastic (horizontal supply curve;  ∞ = s e ), all of the energy tax is according to Eq. (5)
borne by the customers ( 0 / = τ d dPp ). This would also be evident from Figure 1; if the supply
curve were a linear curve parallel with the x-curve, the producer price is given and all the tax
is shifted to the consumers. This could be the case of a unilateral tax increase of oil in a single
country. If the production is shipped by oil tankers, oil companies have great flexibility with
respect to destination. To attract oil, an importing country would have to offer the same
producer price as other countries. Note that this does not necessarily apply to gas supplies, as
large irreversible investments in pipelines and take-or-pay supply contracts locks the supplier
into a long-term relationship with its customers. The reverse result, where all the tax is borne
                                                
8 If the tax correctly measures marginal environmental costs not paid for by the trading parties, however, this is
not to be conceived as a deadweight loss but rather a correction of a negative externality.
9 We have assumed a piece tax. The economic effects of an ad valorem (percentage based) tax are analogous.6
by producers ( 1 / − = τ d dPp ), would be the outcome if demand is perfectly elastic ( ∞ = d e ),
i.e., if the demand curve in Figure 1 is horizontal and parallel with the x-curve. This could be
a case of perfect substitution, e.g., with industrial customers having dual burners. The most
likely scenario, however, is that both supply and demand have finite elasticities, and that the
tax burden is shared among sellers and buyers.
 As for natural gas supply elasticities, adjustments have to be made to the theoretical
tax incidence model. The model is cast in a framework of spot trading. Most of the natural gas
delivered to the European Continent, however, is not traded on spot terms. The gas deliveries
are typically regulated by long-term contracts, so-called take-or-pay contracts. Traditional
spot market incidence is thus replaced by incidence regulated by contract regulations and
procedures for re-negotiation. Tax shifting in a setting of long-term contracts is not addressed
in the present literature. The most important elements of the gas sales contracts, and the
implications for tax incidence, are the topics of the next section.
We have discussed tax incidence empirically in relation to a basic tax incidence theory
and contract theory, with an emphasis on the effect of differing demand elasticities among
countries. The effects of elasticities are general, i.e., they also apply to more advanced
incidence models. In advanced incidence theory, however, additional factors are derived that
may affect incidence. Ideally, we would calculate the general equilibrium before and after the
tax change. The changes would then provide a description of the incidence of the tax. This is
obviously too complicated to pursue. Even at a theoretical level it is complex, since the
economy usually is not disturbed in one dimension, but rather a package of policies.
10 Still,
the necessary conditions for ignoring general equilibrium effects - that the product in question
have a market that is small relative to the entire economy - is typically not satisfied for
different types of energy inputs. It is therefore necessary also to explore general equilibrium
effects. We do this by deriving cross price elasticities with substitutes like LFO and
electricity.
The effect of energy taxes (input factor taxes) depends on whether the customer is a
firm or a household. As for households, an increase in the price of one particular type of
energy induces substitution effects. We might expect substitution towards alternative means
of energy. In the short term the household may be locked into a particular technology
(demanding a certain type of energy), and the substitution effect is therefore likely to be
higher in the long run than in the short run. As for firms, there will be substitution effects and
                                                
10 See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).7
output effects. Some industries, like power generators, have installed dual burners, which are
likely to produce a strong substitution effect, even in the short run. Thus, we might expect a
strong interfuel competition. Firms are facing different types of competitive pressure in
different market segments, calling for a differentiated tax shifting. This is analogous to price
differentiation. Price differentiation could generally be possible for natural gas, due to limited
capacity in pipelines, and for other energy inputs to households, since they may lack access to
the spot-market.
2. Gas Sales Contracts
The majority of gas sales in the EU-area is regulated by long-term gas sales contracts. To
examine tax incidence of natural gas we must understand the price structure of these
contracts. Since there is no regional, let alone globally, liquid traded market price for natural
gas as there is in oil, the market value for natural gas in each sector is typically determined
relative to the price of the principal competing fuel. In the presence of long-term contracts the
tax incidence theory based on spot markets does therefore not apply. Instead, the tax-shifting
pattern is determined by the pricing formulae in the sales contracts.
In regulating contract volumes, the exporting and the importing companies have
conflicting interests. Since gas storage is expensive and in limited supply, the importer would
like to have flexibility with respect to volumes, thus being able to adjust to changes in
downstream demand. Demand fluctuates, especially over the seasons, with a higher demand
in winter than in summer. The exporters, on the other hand, have to sink large irreversible
investments in extraction, processing, and transportation facilities. Before doing so, they
would like to have assurances that they will be able to sell the gas over a considerable period
of time, thus securing a return on their investments. Also, to exploit the extraction, processing
and transportation capacity, the seller would prefer to deliver a stable gas stream at maximum
capacity utilisation. The exporter would – before making large irreversible investments – like
to have some sort of guarantee of recouping his investments. One way of doing this would be
to impose a specific price, a minimum price, or other types of price guarantees for the entire
period of delivery. However, this may eliminate the upside potential for the seller, and it
would also be a bad bargaining strategy for the seller to reveal his reservation price. The
buyers, on the other hand, would like the gas price to be responsive to the price of substitutes
(such as oil products), so that they are able to sell the gas. It is in the interest of both parties to8
have some flexibility in the gas price so that it can adjust to market changes and keep gas a
competitive energy source. The solution is to let the price be flexible but to guarantee the
seller that he will be able to sell certain minimum amounts (volume commitments).
The challenging task for gas contract design is to trade off conflicting interests with
respect to volume and price. The exact contents of these contracts are secret, but the general
contract structure is common knowledge in the gas industry. The major part of gas export to
the EU-region in the period 1990-1998 was sold on long term take-or-pay contracts, see
Brautaset et al. (1998). In these contracts, the buyer agrees to receive a certain volume of gas
per year or, alternatively, to pay for the part of this gas volume that it does not like to receive.
At the same time, the buyer has an option to take out more gas than these minimum annual
amounts, thus conveying flexibility. Substantial volume flexibility is also available on a daily
basis. The contracts specify two types of reference volumes, Daily Contract Quantity (DCQ)
and Annual Contract Quality (ACQ). The annual flexibility is regulated by an interval around
the ACQ, e.g., the buyer is committed to take or pay 85-95 per cent of ACQ, and may have
specific options on annual volumes exceeding ACQ. As for the daily flexibility and
commitments, the buyer may be committed to take or pay 40-50 per cent of DCQ, and the
seller may be committed to deliver up to 110 per cent of DCQ. Additional flexibility for the
buyer is provided by the right to receive at a later time gas that has been paid but not taken
(Make Up Gas), and the right to reduce future delivery if gas take exceeds the commitments
in some years (Carry Forward Gas).
The current price on gas delivered according to the long term take-or-pay contracts is
determined by a price formula. The formula links the current gas price to the price of relevant
energy substitutes, thus continuously securing the buyer competitive terms.
11 The price
formula consists of two parts, a constant basis price (fixed term) and an escalation supplement
linking the gas price to alternative forms of energy (variable term).
12 Examples of alternative
energy commodities used in pricing formulas for natural gas are light fuel oil, heavy fuel oil,
coal, and electricity. Usually a combination of alternatives is used for escalation purposes
(weighted average of energy prices), to reflect the markets for substitutes.
13 Different
techniques are used, e.g., using different types of price lags in the price formulas. The basis
price reflects the parties’ evaluation of the value of the gas at the time of entering the contract.
Each of the alternative energy commodities is assigned a certain weight in the escalation
                                                
11 Adjustments in the gas price are not automatically imposed, though, but by periodical (monthly or quarterly)
recalculations of the contract price by using the price formula and updated prices on substitutes.
12 This is the basic structure on most gas contracts in Europe.9
element, reflecting the competitive situation between natural gas and the substitute. The price
change of each energy commodity is multiplied by an energy conversion factor, to make the
substitute and natural gas commensurable. Thereafter, the individual escalation terms are
multiplied by pass through factors, i.e., the change in the price of the substitute is not fully
reflected in the gas price. A typical price formula is given by
(2.1) () j AEj j j j
j
C EK AE AE P P λ α 0 0 − + = ∑ ,
where  C P  is the gas price paid to the extraction company (producer price),  O P  is the basis
price,  j α  is the weight in the escalation element for substitute  j  (often with ∑ =
j
j 1 α ),
() o AEj AEj −  is the price change for substitute  j  (actual minus reference price), EKAEj is an
energy conversion factor, and  j λ  is the pass through factor for price changes in substitute j .
The pass through factors are typically high, e.g., 0.85 or 0.90. Thus, natural gas prices
in these contracts are highly responsive to price changes in substitutes, and exhibit a high
volatility. This implies that the exporters are carrying a large fraction of the price risk. Price
adjustments for substitutes are based on the difference between current and historic prices.
Current prices are calculated as average prices for a reference period, ranging from three to
nine months. This gives reliable price data and implies a certain lag in the price adjustments,
both upwards and downwards.
3. Tax Incidence for Natural gas
The take-or-pay contracts are complex, containing a number of detailed regulations of
contingencies related to quantities and prices, e.g., the contracts specify the changes in gas
prices that will take place in response to a change in the oil price. Still, there are a number of
feasible contingencies that are not explicitly covered by the contracts, e.g., the contractual
response to deregulation. The contracts must be considered as incomplete, and revisions and
renegotiations take place. According to Hart (1995), an incomplete contracts is best seen as
providing a suitable backdrop or starting point for such renegotiations rather than specifying
the final outcome. The contract should be designed to ensure that, whatever happens, each
party has some protection against bad luck and opportunistic behaviour by the other party.
                                                                                                                                                        
13 Some contracts also contain adjustments for inflation.10
Tax incidence of oil taxes adheres to classical incidence theory, since oil to a large
extent is traded on spot terms. Being traded on long-term contracts, tax incidence of natural
gas is partly determined by the terms of the take-or-pay contracts and partly settled by
renegotiations. Under certain conditions and at certain time intervals the parties of a gas sales
contracts may demand price revisions. The basis for such renegotiations is that (outside the
control of the contracting parties) the value of gas has changed substantially - relative to the
available substitutes - in the buyer’s home country. The overall objective is to maintain the
competitiveness of gas supplies. As for changes in energy taxes, however, oil tax changes
should not call for renegotiations, to the extent that they are covered by the pricing formula
(6).  Let us take the Kyoto case where natural gas is tax favored due to less environmental
damage. In the presence of an increase in oil taxes, and no adjustments in taxes on gas, the
producer gas price would increase with the full extent of the tax according to the pricing
formula, to the extent that the oil price that is part of the pricing formula is tax inclusive (the
export contracts contain differ at this point). An isolated increase in oil taxes is therefore fully
shifted to the gas customers. Thus, there is a cross tax incidence effect from the oil market to
long-term gas sales, specified by the gas sales contracts. This is also reasonable, as the
competitiveness of natural gas has increased due to the change in relative tax rates.
But what happens if there is an increase in gas taxes in the customer's country, e.g. due
to EMU revenue requirements? The implication of such a tax change is not explicitly
regulated by the pricing formula or other terms of the take-or-pay contracts. If the gas taxes
are changed relative to alternative sources of energy, however, the tax change may instigate
the buyer to demand renegotiations of the producer price. Tax changes are reportedly an
essential part of contract renegotiations. It is therefore interesting to characterize this situation
in terms of standard contract theory.
14
First of all, the issues of contract design. Should the contract, according to contract
design principles, contain more specific regulations of who is to bear the burden or gains of
changes in natural gas taxes? A typical reason for having incomplete contractual terms is
enforcement problems, e.g., when critical parameters are not perfectly observable to one or
both of the contracting parties, or when such parameters are not verifiable to a court. Neither
of these enforcement problems seems to apply to energy taxes that are easily measured.
Second, the issue of risk sharing. Increases in energy taxes can be perceived as a
political risk. Standard contract theory prescribes that each of the contracting parties should
                                                
14 See, e.g., Hart (1995), Laffont and Tirole (1993), and Milgrom and Roberts (1992).11
be held accountable for the risk within their own control sphere. The residual risk should be
borne by the party with the lowest risk aversion. As for the latter, both the sellers and buyers
of natural gas in the EU-area are large diversified companies, calling for a sharing of the
residual risk. Whether corporations can influence energy taxes is an open question. Large
transmission companies are likely - on behalf of their customers - to have some influence of
energy taxes in their home countries, at least much more influence than the seller if he is
located in a different country. Overall, therefore, theory prescribes that the buyer should carry
more of the energy tax risk, thus providing them with incentives to keep taxes low, to the
benefit of both the contracting parties.
The take-or-pay contracts can be perceived as a sequence of gas futures and supply
options. In each year the buyer has committed to pay for a minimum quantity. In addition, the
buyer has an option to take additional volumes for a given price (relative to substitutes).
15
This, of course, deviates from the standard spot tax incidence model. In lack of markets,
market forces are replaced by contracts, and the incidence of taxes on natural gas is
determined by renegotiations. Still, underlying market forces could have bearing on
renegotiation processes. It is therefore interesting to outline an analogy to standard incidence
theory.
An important reference point is the minimum quantities that both the seller and the
buyer are committed to, for a given relative price. This means that we have perfectly inelastic
demand and supply, which according to Eq. (1.5) implies that the tax incidence is
undetermined. We get the same result from a graphical analysis, as both curves would be
vertical in Figure 1. Accordingly, the shifting of natural gas taxes is instead determined by
renegotiations, in which the market principle, i.e., the competitiveness of natural gas in
interfuel competition, is decisive.
For the additional volume the buyer has an option to buy, the situation may be a bit
different. The buyer may for additional volumes arbitrage between different sources of gas
supply, i.e., the supplier is likely to face a decreasing demand curve for additional volumes.
With a decreasing demand curve and a vertical supply curve, one would expect that all the gas
tax is shifted to the producer. This presumes, however, that the price is flexible for extra sales.
This is not the case for the take-or-pay contracts, as the relative price is fixed by the contract.
Hence, if the contractual gas price is not perceived competitive - or if the buyer does not need
additional gas - the option is not exercised. In this case, however, there is excess capacity in
                                                
15 In addition to the volume options, the contacts also entail important options in timing, both on a daily and an
annual basis.12
the pipelines. The seller may thus be tempted to reduce prices for marginal volumes. But this
may turn out to induce price pressure on the main supplies and on new gas contracts.
Since it is the producer that undertakes the highest specific investments in
infrastructure, it is this contracting party that most needs contractual protection against
opportunism from the buyer. In the context of taxation, the seller also needs protection against
opportunistic tax setting by the buyer's government that may want to capture parts of the
resource rents from the exporting country. It is unclear whether the existing contracts give the
sellers due protection in this respect. The status quo of the contract renegotiations, however, is
no change in the import price in response to tax changes. This might be to the seller's
advantage in the case of tax increases.
4. Development of Natural Gas Taxes
Figure 2 shows import prices and end-user prices for natural gas in selected countries in USD
per MBtu. The choice of countries has been dictated by data availability. We only plot the ex
tax price for a particular sector when a tax is actually levied on that sector. Hence the
selection of curves for each country provides information on the natural gas taxation regime
in that country. The major exception here is the United States, where the IEA does not present
data on average taxes.
 16 We see that all the European countries included in Figure 2 have
levied taxes on natural gas to the household sector. This sector will be examined more closely
later. For the industry sector and the electricity sector only Germany and the Netherlands have
imposed taxes. However, the Figure 2 indicates that the relative size of the tax is much
smaller for these sectors than for households. When we look at other countries, which are not
included in Figure 2 due to lack of import prices we generally find that taxes on the industry
sector and the electricity sector are small. Hence, in the following we focus particularly on
households.
A more comprehensive overview of the development in household natural gas taxation
in Europe is provided in Figure 3. The figure plots the total tax in percent of the ex tax price.
We see that there were large differences in the tax rate at the end of the 1990s. In 1997, the
last year with observations for all countries, UK and Switzerland had the lowest tax rates
                                                
16 Unlike most countries, taxes on natural gas are not set by the national government in the USA. See IEA
“Energy Prices & Taxes: Quarterly Statistics” for a description of the tax regime in each country.13
(around 7%) and Italy had the highest tax rate (76,5%).
17 However, for all countries there is a
positive trend in the tax rate from the late 1970s to the end of the 1990s. To get a clearer
picture of the overall development we aggregate the national tax rates of the twelve countries
to a simple non-weighted average in Figure 4. We choose to compute two averages, where
one includes and one excludes Italy. From this figure we see that when Italy is included, the
                                                
17 One possible explanation to especially high gas tax in Italy is that Italy is perceived -relative to the other EU-

























































































































































































































































Figure 2. Nominal Import and End-User Prices in USD (1995 Exchange Rate) per MBtu
for Selected Countries (Data source: IEA)15
average tax rate has increased from around 10% in 1978 to around 30% in 1998. When Italy









































































































Figure 4. Average Tax in 12 European Countries on Natural Gas to Household Sector in
Percent of Ex Tax Price16
5. Econometric Analysis of Household Gas Demand
In the previous section we found that taxes on natural gas has increased in the household
sectors of European countries. As shown in Section 2, elasticity estimates are required for
empirical analysis of tax incidence. In this section we present an econometric model of
household sector energy demand. We have a panel data set with annual observations from
several OECD countries to our disposition. In panel data analysis it is customary to pool the
observations from each unit (here: country) together, and estimate models with unit-specific
intercepts which are specified as random or fixed. However, the coefficients associated with
the explanatory variables, the slope coefficients, are assumed to be equal across units. In our
context this implies, for example, that the own price elasticity of natural gas is identical across
countries. In light of results from previous econometric studies and other empirical evidence,
homogeneity restrictions on slope coefficients are not very appealing (Maddala et al., 1997;
Garcia-Cerrutti, 2000). Hence, our models should be specified to allow for cross-country
heterogeneity in demand elasticities.
Estimation of separate demand models for each country gives the greatest degree of flexibility
with respect to elasticity estimates. However, earlier studies have demonstrated that such
regression models often provide implausible elasticity estimates, for example, positive own-
price elasticities (Atkinson & Manning, 1995). In this paper we employ a “shrinkage”
estimator on our demand models (Maddala et al., 1997). This estimator allows for slope
coefficient heterogeneity, but imposes some additional structure on the generation of the true
coefficient values compared to separate regression models. This additional structure is the
assumption of a common probability distribution from which the true parameter values of the
demand models are drawn for each country. The coefficients estimated by the shrinkage
method will be a weighted average of the overall pooled estimate and separate estimates from
each country.
18
In its most general form the demand model is specified as
(5.1) i i i i u X y + = β , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
                                                
18 The ”shrinkage” estimator shrinks estimates from separate regression models towards a population average.17
where yi is a T× 1 vector, Xi is a T× k matrix of observations on the k explanatory variables, β i
is a k× 1 vector of parameters, and ui is a T× 1 vector of random errors which is distributed as ui
~ N(0, σ i
2I).
We assume that
(5.2) β i ~ IN(µ ,Σ ),
or equivalently that
(5.3) β i = µ  + vi,
where  vi ~ N(0,Σ ). Equation (5.2) specifies the prior distribution of β i in the Bayesian
framework. The posterior distribution of β i depends on µ  and Σ . If µ  and Σ  are not known,
priors must be specified. When µ , σ i
2 and Σ  are known, the posterior distribution of β i is
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respectively.  i β ˆ  is the OLS estimate of β i.
If the matrix Xi include lagged values of yi the normality of the posterior distribution of β i
*
holds only asymptotically and under the usual regularity conditions assumed in dynamic
regression models.
In the empirical Bayes approach that we employ, we use the following sample-based
estimates of µ , σ i
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We see that the prior mean µ
* is an average of the β i
*, the estimate of the prior variance Σ * is
obtained from deviations of β i
* from their average µ
*, and the estimate of σ i
2 is obtained from
the residual sum of squares using β i
*, not the OLS estimator  i β ˆ .
The equations (5.6) are estimated iteratively. In the initial iteration the OLS estimator  i β ˆ  is
used to compute µ
*, σ i
2 and Σ *. To improve convergence (5.6c) is modified as
















1 ˆ µ β µ β ,
where R is a diagonal k× k matrix with small values along the diagonal (e.g. 0.001). According
to a Monte-Carlo study by Hu and Maddala (1994), the iterative procedure gives better
estimates in the mean squared sense for both the overall mean µ  and the heterogeneity matrix
Σ   than two-step procedures.
The demand for natural gas in the residential sector is specified as
(5.7)
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where  f p  is the price paid by the residential sector for fuel f, f = E(lectricity), F(uel oil),
N(atural gas), and I is income measured by private consumption. The own-price elasticity of
natural gas demand is eNS = β N and eNL = (β N+β N1)/(1 - β Y) in the short and long run,
respectively. Analogous measures apply to the other prices and income. We expect light fuel
oil (LFO) to be a substitute for natural gas. Electricity is also a substitute, but in many19
countries electricity is primarily used for electric appliances and to a smaller extent for
heating. Hence, we expect smaller cross-price elasticities between natural gas demand and the
price of electricity.
Table 1 shows the shrinkage estimates of the natural gas demand elasticities in the
household sector. Except for the electricity price, all elasticities have the expected signs. The
electricity elasticities are small, however, and probably reflects that natural gas and electricity
have different roles. According to Table 1 gas demand is most sensitive to income changes,
and less sensitive to changes in the own price and the price of fuel oil.

















Austria -0.127 -0.158 0.142 0.177 0.007 0.009 0.537 0.669
Belgium -0.115 -0.143 0.145 0.180 0.011 0.014 0.574 0.716
Canada -0.082 -0.102 0.136 0.169 -0.022 -0.027 0.608 0.758
Denmark -0.171 -0.213 0.202 0.252 -0.022 -0.028 0.429 0.535
Finland -0.263 -0.328 0.164 0.205 -0.063 -0.078 0.356 0.444
France -0.131 -0.163 0.156 0.195 -0.018 -0.023 0.552 0.688
Germany -0.153 -0.191 0.159 0.198 -0.042 -0.052 0.524 0.653
Ireland -0.223 -0.279 0.145 0.181 -0.066 -0.082 0.446 0.556
Italy -0.115 -0.143 0.062 0.077 -0.111 -0.138 0.609 0.758
Netherlands -0.072 -0.089 0.092 0.115 0.062 0.077 0.633 0.789
Spain -0.133 -0.166 0.219 0.274 0.043 0.054 0.450 0.561
Switzerland -0.167 -0.208 0.108 0.134 -0.119 -0.148 0.470 0.586
UK -0.059 -0.074 0.153 0.191 -0.010 -0.012 0.612 0.763
USA -0.070 -0.087 0.124 0.155 0.040 0.050 0.619 0.772
According to the Kyoto agreement fuel oil should have a higher tax than natural gas due to
higher CO2 emissions per unit. One implication of the empirical results in Table 1 is that an
increase in fuel oil taxes which is equal to or larger than a tax increase on natural gas leads to
an increase in natural gas demand.
Given the estimated short run and long run demand elasticities we can calculate tax
incidence by means of formula (2.5). One intermediate result is that – as expected – a larger
fraction of the tax increase will be borne by the suppliers in the long run than in the short run,
due to larger substitution possibilities. If we have supply elasticities available, exact incidence
may be calculated by the formula. Given the technological structure of the industry, one can
postulate rather small supply elasticities with a reasonably high capacity utilization.
19 For
example, if the elasticity of supply is 0.7, then the incidence on producer price for two
                                                
19 For discussions of the supply side structure in Europe, see e.g. Mathiesen, Roland & Thonstad (1987) and
Golombek, Gjelsvik & Rosendahl (1998)20
European countries representing the extremes in Table 1 with respect to own-price elasticities,
the Netherlands and Finland, is –0.072/(0.7+0.072) = -0.093 for and -0,263/(0,7+0,263) = -






























































Figure 5. Ratio of Change in Producer Price to Tax Change for Netherlands and
Finland
The analysis in this section provides some empirical insights on the effect of taxes on end-
user prices in the household sector. Import prices should also decline when taxes increase in
an end-user sector. However, as suggested earlier in this paper, the extent of backward tax
shifting in the value chain is influenced by several institutional and technological factors.
We have examined tax incidence from the perspective of tax incidence theory,
presuming spot markets. The spot market approach could be interesting in a situation of long-
term contracts if spot market forces were decisive in renegotiations of the contracts, in terms
of dictating the ex post bargaining power. In the next section we check whether this actually
were the case, by using contract data to analyse the actual effect of taxes on import prices.
6. Empirical Analysis of Natural Gas Import Price Incidence21
How has import prices (i.e. producers) been affected by the increase in taxes on households?
If transmission companies and local distribution (T&LD) companies receive approximately a
fixed fee per unit of the gas they bring from the border to the consumers, then the aggregate
supply curve of producers will be a parallel curve below the aggregate supply curve of the
T&LD companies. If a unit tax is introduced or increased, and supply curves are upwards
sloping then the producer price and T&LD price should decline, according to tax incidence
theory. Has this happened? If we go back to Figure 2 it is difficult to visually observe whether
this has taken place.
In order to uncover the effect of taxes on import prices we estimate the following
regression model:
(6.1) lnIMPi,t = α i + α OIL⋅ lnOILi,t +α TAX⋅ lnTAXi,t +α PRIVCON⋅ lnCONCAPi,t +ui,t,
where IMPi,t is the import price to country i in year t, OIL is the spot price of Brent blend oil,
TAX is the tax on natural gas in the household sector, and CONCAP is private consumption
per capita – a proxy for income. The Brent spot price is included to account for the fact that
natural gas contract prices are heavily influenced by the price of oil. Hence, there should be a
strong positive relationship between the import price and the oil price. Private consumption is
included to account for shifts in the household sector demand curve. With an upward sloping
producer supply curve we expect a positive relationship between private consumption and the
import price. Country-specific effects α i are included to capture cross-country differences in
technology, competition and regulation which influence the import price. The log-log
specification implies that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.
Table 2 presents the empirical results from the import price regression model.
Unfortunately, we have to drop the majority of observations due to the lack of import price
data for many countries and years.
20 We first estimate a pooled model where α i = α 0 for all i.
The coefficients in this model have all the expected signs and are significant at conventional
confidence levels. In particular, the estimate of α TAX suggests that higher taxes in the
household sector is associated with lower import prices, i.e., lower producer prices, in the
pooled model.
Table 2. Empirical Results from Import Price Regression Model*22
Coeff. Pooled model Fixed effects model
Coef. St.Err. t-ratio Coef. St.Err. t-ratio
α OIL 0,473 0,105 4,524 0,511 0,091 5,617
α TAX -0,029 0,007 -4,171 0,003 0,013 0,265
α CONCAP 0,170 0,067 2,551 0,294 0,137 2,147
α 0 -4,230 1,371 -3,085 -7,360 3,102 -2,373
* N = 59 observations.
However, the results change when we estimate a model with country-specific fixed
effects. Use of country-specific intercept is supported by an F-test with a test statistic of 4.06,
which leads to rejection of homogeneity at the 1% level ((8,47) df). As in the pooled model,
the import price increases significantly with a higher oil price and higher per capita income.
But there is no longer a significant negative relationship between the import price and
household taxes. Since, the fixed-effects models is the most credible, we are lead to conclude
that in this sample increases in household sector taxes had a negligible effect on import prices.
In other words, import countries have not been able to shift parts of the tax increases
backwards to the producers. Thus, spot market forces have not been decisive in the
renegotiations of the take-or-pay contracts.
One obvious reason for lack of spot influence on contract renegotiation is that there
has not been an efficient spot market at the European Continent in the period we analyse.
Still, the gas transmission companies have had several sources of gas to select from, mainly
Russia, The Netherlands, Norway and Algeria. The long-term contracts with these countries,
first of all The Netherlands and Norway, also contain swing elements (call options) that allow
for additional volumes. But even if the take-or-pay contracts have periodical renegotiations,
they probably do not mimic spot contracts. First of all, contract volumes are to a large degree
fixed, and not subject to renegotiation. Second, some of the contracts have special provisions
dealing with tax increases. The deviations from spot trading were necessary - at the time - to
induce large irreversible investments in infrastructure, taking into account the political risk of
increased energy taxes in the importing countries once gas penetration is high.
Conclusion
By deriving income elasticities and cross price elasticities, we have examined some of the
general equilibrium effects of energy taxes. In addition, there are dynamic incidence effects to
                                                                                                                                                        
20 The following countries were included in our estimating sample: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,23
be considered. Tax increases on capital intensive industries may generally have the effect of
reducing the market value of the capital assets, thus capitalising the effects of the tax change.
An unexpected tax increase, in any part of the value chain, is likely to reduce the value of
natural resource licenses and the value of irreversible investments made in extraction and
transportation facilities. For countries that are net importers of energy it may therefore be
tempting to raise energy taxes, at the expense of the exporting firms (windfall loss). This
static gain for the importing country, however, would lead to dynamic costs in terms of
reduced investment incentives, lower future energy supply, and higher prices in the future.
Unexpected reductions in profits, being caused by regulations or tax increases, has a double
investment disincentive effect. It not only reduces expected future returns but also induces
political risk. Exporters may suspect that gas taxes are kept low initially, to develop gas
infrastructure, and increased when gas penetration is high. Note that this not necessarily
would have to be a clever scheme designed to capture resource rents, but rather a natural
development in tax design. At first, gas development in the importing countries are typically
headed by the ministry of energy in each individual country. When gas consumption rises it
raises the attention of the ministry of finance (or the EU) who discovers a potential new
source of tax revenue.
Energy taxes may also have implications for the reliability of supply, as we have seen
for the supply of electricity in California. In that case, supply fell due to price regulations,
reducing the producers' margins. An increase in energy taxes will - as we have demonstrated -
be partly shifted to the producers and thus have the same effect of reducing margins and
investment incentives. Resource extraction has long lead times. Exploration and resource
estimation is a time consuming process and field development usually takes several years.
Also, the development in supply is often not smooth, due to large average size of new
development projects. Negative supply shocks can therefore not be precluded.
Tax incidence for different types of energies in different market segments are vital
inputs to the strategy generating process of petroleum companies. In developing optimal
export strategies, the companies will have to ascertain the probability of a rent capturing
strategy by various importing countries. To reduce the extent of this type of downside risk,
two types of strategies may be pursued, 1) maintaining export flexibility, and 2) reducing the
possibility for rent capturing by contractual terms. In spot trading, e.g., for oil, the first
strategy is the traditional choice. Export flexibility in this setting requires interoperability of
                                                                                                                                                        
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK.24
transportation systems and a certain number of alternative commercial outlets for the oil that
is extracted. If an importing country unilaterally increases its oil consumption tax, oil
exporters thus have the possibility of diverting their exports away from that particular
country. This corresponds to exporting countries having high supply elasticities for exports to
any particular country, implying that a unilateral increase in consumption energy taxes must
to a large extent be borne by the consumers of that particular country. In case of a coordinated
tax increase in a number of importing countries, however, producers have not the same
possibility to shift taxes to consumers. Coordinated imported tax increases thus pose a
considerable commercial risk for energy exporters.
Gas exports are – for technical and economic reasons - most often transmitted
by means of pipelines. Presently, this implies limited export flexibility, often the entire gas
supply from a pipeline goes to a single customer, typically a large transmission company. The
supplier is thus locked into a long-term relationship with one commercial party. Due to the
high level of irreversible and specific investments, this involves a high hold-up risk, which is
why natural gas exports often are regulated by long-term contracts that protect each of the
contracting parties from opportunistic behaviour. Our preliminary empirical findings indicate
that these contracts so far have been able to protect the exporters of natural gas from rent
capture by the importing countries.
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